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It is a platitude that the issue of abortion polarizes people into 
extreme positions. In this paper, I explore the oft-neglected gray 
area between the pro-life stance and pro-choice views. In particular, 
I am interested in the fact that some defenders of abortion rights 
claim that they could or would never have one themselves. 
Similarly, I am struck by the fact that advocates of the right to 
choose often criticize women for repeatedly using abortion as a 
substitute for birth control. It is also commonly held that an ethics 
of virtue can have little or nothing to say about issues involving 
the need for action guidance. I will argue that virtue ethics, because 
of its emphasis on the character and motives of the agent, is able to 
help guide action and, in fact, is far better equipped to explain the 
moral responses in the gray area than utilitarianism. 
I divide this essay into four sections. In the first, I avoid having 
to answer the troublesome question about when a set of cells 
becomes a person by applying a tactic first used by R. M. Hare. 
Second, using two hypothetical cases, I suggest that Hare's 
utilitarian calculation is at odds with the moral intuitions commonly 
found in the gray area. Next, I examine Rosalind Hursthouse's 
virtue ethics and how she applies it to abortion. Finally, I explore 
Michael Slote's "warm agent-based" form of virtue ethics in light 
of the abortion debate. I ultimately conclude that, as these examples 
in the gray area indicate, character and motives are essential parts 
in the decision making process, and that virtue ethics can have 
something to say about the issue of abortion. 
Questions about "Personhood" 
Generally, the debate about abortion centers on the question of 
when the fetus obtains rights, usually through some notion of 
"personhood." Authors like Mary Anne Warren argue that having 
an abortion should be no different than having an appendectomy,1 
Auslegung, Vol. 25, No. 2 
138 AUSLEGUNG 
and that fetal rights (if there were such a thing) cannot interfere 
with a woman's right to choose what happens to her body. Others, 
like John T. Noonan and Don Marquis, 2 ascribe personhood to the 
fetus, usually at a specific point in time, and argue that to kill an 
innocent person is morally wrong. Yet there is no medical or ethical 
consensus on when a set of cells inside of a woman becomes a 
person, and so the question about when life begins is a dividing 
line between two positions. The purpose of this paper is not to 
determine what constitutes life, and so I want to move away from 
that troublesome question. R. M. Hare, in his influential article 
"Abortion and the Golden Rule" makes a move to avoid just these 
arguments about fetal rights and personhood in favor of considering 
ALL potential lives when making moral decisions. Hare wants to 
consider every fetus a "potential person" (a theoretical move he 
gets from Michael Tooley)3 and make a utilitarian calculation that 
includes considerations for all of these potential people. He 
sidesteps the troublesome process of determining which fetus is a 
person and which is just organic matter by applying his calculation 
to all fetuses. Hare justifies this by adapting Kant's Categorical 
Imperative into this maxim: "We should do to others as we are 
glad that they did to us." 4 The "others" in question here can be any 
"potential persons." 
After applying this rule to expose the interests of the potential 
being who may be aborted, Hare makes a utilitarian calculation 
and determines that "if the termination of this pregnancy facilitates 
or renders possible or probable the beginning of a more propitious 
one, it really does not take much to justify it ." 5 He uses the example 
of a woman pregnant with a Down's syndrome child and her 
decision whether or not to go through with the pregnancy. If the 
choice is between having a Down's child but no others (at least in 
part due to the stresses of raising the handicapped child) or aborting 
the Down's child in favor of a future (and most likely non-Down's) 
child, she should maximize utility by choosing to abort. The future 
child she wants to have in lieu of the Down's child will very likely 
be capable of greater happiness than the handicapped one, Hare 
argues. He makes it part of his calculation that it is generally a 
good thing (it maximizes happiness) to be a parent, although he is 
not endorsing unlimited procreation for all persons because of the 
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social/environmental consequences.6 Using two hypothetical cases, 
I will contend that Hare's conclusions about abortion, argued from 
the potentiality principle, conflict with our common sense moral 
intuitions. 
Two Abortion Situations 
Consider the two following hypothetical situations involving 
women considering abortion: 
1. The first woman is forty-five years old, happily married to 
a financially secure husband, and holds a part-time job. 
She is already a mother, with a twenty-one year old 
daughter and a fourteen year old son with attention-deficit 
disorder that requires her to "stay on him" about chores, 
homework, etc. She is in excellent health and will most 
likely have a healthy baby, despite her age, and could quit 
her job without repercussions. This pregnancy was 
certainly an accident (a "change of life" baby) and she is 
considering having an abortion primarily because of the 
impact it will have on her existing children, as well as her 
own doubts about being a sixty-plus year old mother to a 
teenager. 
2. The second woman is a twenty-two year old college student 
who works various part-time jobs and still relies heavily 
on her parents. She has been sexually active since she was 
sixteen and has already had two abortions because of 
"drunken mistakes" in her teens. The father is a casual 
acquaintance, and neither is at all interested (or ready) for 
the responsibility of parenthood. She drinks, smokes, and 
dabbles in harder drugs recreationally, and has done so 
(unknowingly) since the time of conception, but not since 
she found out about the pregnancy. She has decided to 
abort this child, and has also decided to act more 
responsibly. Keeping the child would likely force her to 
drop out of school, work a dead end job, and possibly even 
embitter her because of opportunities lost on her part. 
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What would Hare say about these cases? We must remember that 
we are not interested in whether or not these particular fetuses are 
persons or non-persons, only in the potential person who would be 
bom should the pregnancy come to term. I believe he reasons as 
follows: 
1. Hare would likely argue that the first woman was not 
justified in having an abortion. The likelihood of another 
pregnancy is very slim due to her age, and to deprive this 
potential person a life without the possibility of an even 
further-off potential person with more capacity for 
happiness would be morally wrong. Chances are, despite 
the mother's misgivings, this child will grow up loved and 
well-cared for, even if her brother's life may suffer from 
his mother's inability to nurture him in the way he is 
accustomed. 
2. Given the distinct possibility of health problems with this 
potential child (because of mom's substance use and past 
abortions), and the decision of the mother for a lifestyle 
change for the better, Hare would probably conclude that 
the future child of the second woman will be better off 
than the present one. Having this child now would likely 
lead to a tense mother/daughter relationship ("Do you know 
the sacrifices I had to make to have you?") whereas the 
future child, likely to be bom after the mother is in a better 
place emotionally and financially (because of her lifestyle 
change), would have better chances of a full and happy 
life. 
Do these conclusions square with our general moral reactions? I 
would say that they are not. The second woman, who has shown a 
pattern of using abortion as a matter of contraception, and who 
wants to have an abortion for what seem to be very self-serving 
reasons (even with the lifestyle changing she has promised herself), 
seems to be the kind of person we would argue was acting poorly. 
The first, on the other hand, who favors abortion in this case for 
the sake of her existing children, as well as the welfare of the 
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potential one, is someone many people would sympathize with and 
laud for her ability to make a difficult moral decision. So 
utilitarianism, or at least Hare's version of "Golden Rule" 
utilitarianism, doesn't seem to coordinate with our moral instincts. 
This is where an ethics of virtue can provide some aid, to help 
justify how and why we acquire these moral intuitions about this 
troubling issue. 
Virtue Theory 
What exactly can virtue say about abortion? Many people 
would bristle at the notion that an ethic of virtue might even come 
close to endorsing abortion at all because the two terms (virtue and 
abortion) must be, in some way, mutually exclusive. But that kind 
of reaction is one that seems to interconnect the idea of virtue in 
with deontological duties and rules (virtue is a positive attitude 
toward those duties and rules) or utilitarian calculations (virtue is 
a state of character which helps to maximize the good), rather than 
appealing to virtue itself. A true virtue approach is one that brings 
the agent, and not the action, to the fore. Virtue ethics (henceforth 
abbreviated as VE) does not seek primarily to answer the question 
"What ought I to do in x situation?" as more traditional theories try 
to do. VE instead wants to ask "What kind of person should I be 
overall?" or "What kind of life ought I to be living?" focusing less 
on specific events and actions, and more on character over time. 
However, as action guidance is vital to any ethical system, VE 
proposes that proper action (what I should do in x situation) will 
follow from being a virtuous person and living a virtuous life. This 
is only a skeletal outline, however, and we will look at two different 
strains of virtue theory as presented by Rosalind Hursthouse and 
Michael Slote, the former deemed "agent-focused" and the latter 
called "warm agent-based." I should point out that, like Hursthouse, 
"I am not trying to solve the problem of abortion; I am illustrating 
how virtue theory directs one to think about it." This paper does 
not pretend to hold the elusive answer to whether or not a person 
should have an abortion. Abortion, after all, is a complex issue, 
and as Slote so eloquently puts it, "Any ethical theory that makes 
it too easy always to know what to do or feel will seem to that 
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extent flawed or even useless because untrue to our soberer sense 
of the wrenching complexity of moral phenomena." 7 This is an 
attempt to understand why we feel the way we do about abortion 
in certain situations, and what virtue has to do with those feelings. 
Hursthouse's VE and its Application 
Hursthouse finds a conceptual link between right actions and 
virtuous agents, and then another from virtue to flourishing/living 
well/eudaimonia. She argues, contrary to the critics of VE that: 
Every virtue generates a positive instruction (act justly, 
kindly, courageously, honestly, etc.) and every vice a 
prohibition (do not act unjustly, cruelly, like a coward, 
dishonestly, etc.). So trying to decide what to do within 
a framework of virtue theory is not, as some people 
seem to imagine, necessarily a matter of taking one's 
favorite candidate for a virtuous person and asking 
oneself, "What would they do in these circumstances?" 
.. .The agent may now ask herself, "If I were to do such 
and such now, would I be acting justly or unjustly (or 
neither), kindly or unkindly, and so on?"8 
Many critics object that VE cannot properly provide a system of 
action guidance for the non-virtuous or those unsure of what virtue 
would recommend. Hursthouse finds action guidance intrinsic in 
VE, however, and sees the virtues themselves providing the 
guidance, giving positive instruction for each situation based on 
circumstances and the use of phronesis, or practical wisdom, the 
"ability to reason correctly about practical matters." 9 It is important 
to note here that this wisdom is not some sort of technical knowledge 
only available to philosophers, but a practical wisdom that is not 
elitist in nature. Achieving virtue will not necessarily be easy 
because, as Slote has said: 
Acting rightly is difficult, and does call for much moral 
wisdom, and the relevant condition of adequacy, which 
virtue theory meets, is that it should have built into it an 
explanation of a truth expressed by Aristotle, namely 
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that moral knowledge—unlike mathematical 
knowledge—cannot be acquired merely by attending 
lectures and is not characteristically found in people 
too young to have much experience in life.10 
Hursthouse thinks that her conception of VE applies to real 
moral issues and real moral guidance. She thinks VE can 
(sometimes) answer the question: "should I do JC?" that its critics 
often find it unable to do. She does so by taking a look at the moral 
dilemma of abortion, a situation which might well be called a "tragic 
dilemma." On definitions alone, the idea of a virtuous agent being 
in a tragic dilemma might seem contradictory because a tragic 
dilemma is one from which "it is impossible to emerge with clean 
hands."" How could a virtuous agent ever be in a situation from 
which she emerges with dirty hands? Dirty hands, after all, imply 
that one has acted and that what she has done is wrong, resulting in 
a contradiction between the virtuous character and the moral 
wrongness of the act. At first glance, this may be the case, but 
Hursthouse points out that when faced with a tragic dilemma, a 
virtuous agent does not act callously, unjustly, or in any way 
indicative of a vice (she does not act as the unjust agent would) 
but instead performs the act with "immense regret and pain, instead 
of indifferently or gladly, as the callous or dishonest or unjust one 
does." 1 2 This is not to say that they will emerge from this dilemma 
unmarred because, in fact, certain situations may result in agent 
living the rest of her life "haunted by sorrow." 1 3 This sense of 
sorrow, guilt, and regret is what Hursthouse calls the "remainder" 
of an act, and may result from not only tragic dilemmas, but 
resolvable and irresolvable ones as well. Theorists like Gerald 
Gaus have argued that acts resulting from certain degrees of physical 
coercion are not really choices at all. He cites the example of 
William Styron's novel Sophie's Choice, in which the main character 
is forced by her Nazi captors to choose which of her two children 
will live and which will die. Her "choice" was not really much of 
a choice at all, as it was fully coerced, but the remainder was 
enormous, and she finally commits suicide to assuage her guilt. 
While there may be cases of coercive abortion (and maybe 
psychological pressures from men on women would fit that 
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description), this does not generally seem to be the case. What 
Hursthouse ultimately wants to say about tragic dilemmas is that 
virtue ethics doesn't attempt to action-guide when it shouldn't, 
and as a result, it is possible for an abortion to be performed by a 
virtuous agent, provided that they do it with sufficient regret and 
sorrow (and remainder will surely be present as well). 
Hursthouse attempts to prove her point (and silence her critics) 
by applying VE to a real issue in applied ethics, abortion, in her 
article "Virtue Theory and Abortion," first published in 1991. She 
avoids arguments about the legality of abortion or about the right 
to have an abortion, and instead focuses only on the question, "In 
having an abortion in these circumstances, would the agent be acting 
virtuously, viciously, or neither?" 1 4 She also avoids the tricky 
question about the moral status of the fetus by instead focusing on 
the "familiar biological facts" about pregnancy, concluding that 
the status of the fetus is "simply not relevant to the tightness or 
wrongness of abortion." 1 5 To apply consideration to the fetus, she 
says, is to infer too much from the biological facts at hand. These 
facts, that pregnancy usually occurs after intercourse, generally 
lasts nine months during which time the fetus grows inside the 
mother, and eventually results in the delivery of a living baby, are 
empirical and require no inference. To derive some sort of 
conclusion about the fetus from these empirical facts is to 
overestimate their importance, but it is an attempt to try to fit the 
problem into some existing deontic rule system ("don't kill anything 
with the right to life") or an existing consequentialist system, rather 
than to face the facts straight on. The biological facts, along with 
other observations about a parent's love for her child, the closeness 
of family, and the role our emotions play in these relationships, are 
what need to be considered when we ask the question "How do 
these facts figure in the practical reasoning, actions and passions, 
thoughts and reactions, of the virtuous and non-virtuous?" 1 6 These 
facts about emotions show that arguments like Warren's, where 
abortion is likened to an appendectomy or a haircut, are callous 
and light-minded attitudes to have not only about fetuses, but also 
human life and death, parenthood, and family.1 7 The assessment 
of fetal death later in the pregnancy is seen as much more "tragic" 
in some sense not because of some sense of "personhood" that is 
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developed at a certain time (e.g. third trimester) but because of the 
fact that the mother has "lived with it longer, conscious of its 
existence," 1 8 in a sense coming to grips with the experience of 
having a life inside of her and of life itself. 
Are there situations where abortions would be permissible? 
She alleges that socioeconomic and cultural considerations weigh 
heavily: women who were forced to make their livings doing 
physically demanding things such as hauling coal through tunnels 
were not acting callously by aborting pregnancy as a physical 
condition, and while to go through with the pregnancy would 
probably be heroic, to not go through with it would not necessarily 
be vicious. But presently, where hauling coal in tunnels is not the 
norm, can there still be justifications, especially considering the 
common observations that parenthood, chi ldbear ing, and 
motherhood are usually considered worthwhile endeavors and 
probably even an important part of human flourishing? Consider 
that we often call those people who complain about "not being 
ready" for parenthood selfish, childish, or irresponsible, and we 
even say the same thing about couples who choose to remain 
childless. Our second case seems to be an example of just this lack 
of the virtues of caring and self-responsibility. How could this 
observation ever allow virtue to justify abortion? It is because 
while childrearing and motherhood are facets of human flourishing, 
they are not the only ones! There are other ways to flourish without 
being a parent (Consider those persons who are naturally sterile-
are they doomed to worthless lives? I would hope not!); a life 
dedicated to helping others may not involve motherhood, but may 
still be fully virtuous. 
Hursthouse then asks us to consider women who have abortions 
because carrying the pregnancy to term would put their lives at 
risk, or who already have "a life centered around some other 
worthwhile activity or activities," 1 9 or because they feel they are 
too old to raise a child, or a that another child will hamper their 
rearing of other children already in their care. The last two mirror 
almost exactly the agent from our first case above, and Hursthouse 
wants to grant that her act is not vicious. It will likely, strictly on 
the basis of the (potential) human life that was cut short, result in a 
remainder. Hursthouse explicitly states that "even when the 
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decision to have an abortion is the right decision-one that does not 
fall under a vice-related term and thereby one that the perfectly 
virtuous would recommend-it does not follow that there is no sense 
in which having the abortion is wrong or guilt-appropriate."2 0 Even 
in those cases where the decision is the right one, if it was prompted 
by the absence of a virtuous character trait in the agent at the time 
of conception (a drunken lack of temperance, lack of self-
responsibility, etc), it may still be the reflection of a moral failing, 
and may have a greater remainder than others who did not have 
those moral character traits missing at the time of procreation. To 
sum it up in as broad a stroke as possible, Hursthouse finds that a 
virtuous agent could have an abortion and not be vicious (and would 
still be virtuous), but the remainder (a necessary result for the 
virtuous person) of the act of killing another (potential) human 
being will not leave them unmarred. 
Slote's VE and its Application 
Although we have seen that Hursthouse's virtue approach 
squares more with the moral reactions present in the gray area than 
Hare's utilitarianism, hers is not the only theory that may be 
applicable in the case of abortion. Slote, in his article, "Agent-
Based Virtue Ethics," and his book manuscript, Morals From 
Motives, makes a move to evaluate moral choices in light of the 
virtues as evidenced by the motives and psychological states of the 
agent. Slote contends that Hursthouse's Aristotelian VE is "agent-
focused" and puts a greater emphasis on "the evaluation of agents 
and character traits" 2 1 than it does on actions. The problem for all 
Aristotelian approaches is that they, like Aristotle himself, "offer 
no defense of generalized concern for (other) people." 2 2 
Influenced by British sentimentalists like Hume, Hutchinson, 
and, particularly, James Martineau, as well as by feminist theorists 
of psychological caring (Carol Gilligan) and of feminine ethics 
(Nel Noddings), Slote derives an approach to virtue ethics that he 
calls "warm agent-based." It is "agent-based" because it "treats 
the moral and ethical status of actions as entirely derivative from 
independent and fundamental ethical/aretaic facts (or claims) about 
the motives, dispositions, or inner life of the individuals who 
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perform them." 2 3 It is "warm" because it treats compassion (or 
benevolence) as the highest of all secular motives and evaluates 
human action in light of this motive, as opposed to "cool" theories 
such as Plato's and Nietzsche's that treat the health and virtue of 
the soul as the highest of motives and view inner strength as the 
focal point of understanding human action. 2 4 It seems entirely 
plausible that people regularly evaluate actions from a more 
sentimentalist perspective than from the perspective of the health 
of the soul. We laud people who act in ways that help others not 
because it is good for their soul, or even because they have a good 
soul, but because the act is benevolent and caring. 
He also takes great pains to point out that it is not contrary to 
virtue to be benevolent in a particularistic sort of way. Universal 
benevolence seems counterintuitive at some points: why should I 
care the same for a stranger in a far away land as I do my own 
daughter or son? Hursthouse points out the value of emotions in 
relation to the family, and Slote defends this idea with the work of 
Noddings and Gilligan. Universal, or humanitarian, benevolence 
is still of value to a warm agent-baser, but it must be tempered with 
particularistic concern for one's compatriots, as well as a general 
regard for the well being of one's self. A feminine ethic of caring 
should say "that it is best and most admirable to be motivated by 
concern for others in balance with self-concern"25 and humanitarian 
concern. 
Slote's theory of warm agent-basing still faces the same 
criticism that Hursthouse, and all of VE, does; namely, that VE 
cannot legitimately be applied to real world ethical issues. While 
Slote intends for his warm agent-basing to be predominately an 
evaluative moral project, he does make an argument that it can be 
applied to ethical issues. He does not use the abortion example, 
but instead imagines a person whose mother has taken ill and must 
fly urgently to see her in the hospital. It would make no sense, 
given minimal information ("your mother is in intensive care-get 
here quickly") for that person to make a decision about what kind 
of measures should be used to keep the ailing mothers alive. To 
make a choice out of hand, as a knee-jerk reaction, would likely 
reflect indifference or selfishness, rather than the kind of 
compassion and benevolence one expects from family. Even if the 
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choice turned out to be the "right" one, or the one an informed 
virtuous agent would have made, it stems from wrong motivations 
and a lack of insight. If her illness is severe, it is the agent's moral 
responsibility to obtain, when he gets to the hospital, all of the 
facts before deciding her course of treatment. It would be careless 
and shallow (and certainly not virtuous) for him to make a snap 
decision, or decide on the plane, or decide years before the fact, 
without fully understanding the intricacies of the situation. Once 
one has ascertained the facts, one's "inward gaze effectively 
'doubles back' on the world and allows one to take facts about the 
world into account in one's attempt to determine what is morally 
acceptable or best to do." 2 6 To judge someone who acts in this 
way against a backdrop of warm-agent basing, one "judges a certain 
course of action or decision by reference to, say, the benevolence 
of the motives of its agent" and judges "in relation to an inner 
factor that itself makes reference to and takes account of facts about 
people in the world." 2 7 
Slote finds in the mother example above, that certain situations 
would dictate a virtuous agent to not endorse heroic measures be 
used to save his mother, or that he would allow the plug to be 
pulled, as an act of benevolence. Following Slote's lead, it is time 
to apply his theory to our two cases. In the first case, the woman, 
given her reflection and considering her balanced caring, may be 
acting in a benevolent, warm-agent based way, in having the 
abortion. If her motives are truly about both her current children 
and the potential negative effects of her advanced age on her 
potential child, her painful decision may be in accordance with 
virtue. Slote does not address what Hursthouse calls "the 
remainder" in his work, but this virtuous agent would likely have 
one, despite the fact that she acted from benevolence. The second 
case, however, seems to be acting from indifference to the potential 
child inside of her, irresponsibly, and in continuation of a pattern 
of abortion as birth control that a lawyer might say "goes to motive." 
Even if her life is turned around by this incident, and her future 
children benefit, her motives here are far from benevolent and 
caring, and are certainly not reflective in a "doubling-back" sense. 
Again, as we saw with Hursthouse, we have VE at odds with Hare's 
conclusions, and in line with what we assume are fairly widespread 
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moral intuitions about our cases: we want to condemn those who 
act irresponsibly and selfishly, and laud those who make tough 
choices after heart-rending reflection, often with damaging results 
to their own psyche. 
It is interesting that many of the people in the "gray area" about 
abortion, those who support the legal right to choose but say that 
they could not have an abortion themselves, are educated and 
reflective individuals involved in nursing, midwifery, and other 
healthcare professions. Both Hursthouse and Slote emphasize some 
sort of reflection (as phronesis or "doubling-back") as a central 
tenet of their virtue theory, and it may be that this is what guides 
these people; reflection, in the face of confronting mortality, about 
the value of life. There are, however, also reflective people who 
are morally opposed to abortion. It may be that they are strict 
deontologists, with certain views on fetal rights to life. They may 
be that they are so enamored with a virtue of universal, rather than 
partial, benevolence that they cannot stand the thought of another 
potential person being deprived of life. They may be reflective 
consequentialists who find any loss of innocent life harmful to 
overall utility. It simply may be the case that those people who 
concur with the intuitions from our cases are already sympathetic 
to virtue ethics as an ethical system, even if they aren't aware of its 
theory. We must remember, though, that in the end it is not the 
system that guides the virtuous agent, it is virtue itself. 
As I stated earlier, my goal in this paper was not to "solve" the 
problem of abortion: It is not an issue that is easily resolvable. 
Instead, I wanted to shine a light into the gray area and try to 
understand what an ethics of virtue can say about this issue. 
Reflection and consideration about oneself and one's actions is 
vital when facing any ethically challenging issue. We can take 
steps toward becoming virtuous by attempting to emulate and 
understand the virtuous agent and by internalizing her motives and 
reasoning processes. We can try to be caring and benevolent, and 
not make judgments off the cuff about topics like abortion without 
ample consideration of all of the facts, and we may find that virtue 
is a most effective way of understanding the moral problems we 
face. I do believe that virtue ethics helps us to understand certain 
moral intuitions that we have about issues, and shows that the 
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motives of the agent performing an act should matter and not just 
the consequences of the act. It may still be a long way for most 
(myself included) people to get from a deontological or a 
consequentialist mentality toward an ethics of virtue, but 
considerations like these may give us reason to head in just that 
direction. 
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